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NOTES
Health Policy-Ensuring Informed Consent in Human
Experimentation: A Comparison of the Approaches of Two
States
In 1976, New York enacted the first comprehensive state legisla-
tion regulating research' using human subjects-the Protection of
Human Subjects Article (New York Article).2 California followed suit
in 1978 with the enactment of the Protection of Human Subjects in
Medical Experimentation Act (California Act).3 The central focus of
1. Research, or experimentation, is a medical or scientific intervention that, unlike medical
or psychiatric therapy or treatment, is not undertaken in order to benefit directly the health of the
subject, or that makes use of procedures other than those established and accepted by the medical
community. Compare New York's statutory definition of "human research":
any medical experiments, research, or scientific or psychological investigation, which
utilizes human subjects and which involves physical or psychological intervention by the
researcher upon the body of the subject and which is not required for the purposes of
obtaining information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of disease or the assess-
ment of medical condition for the direct benefit of the subject.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2441(2) (McKinney 1977), with California's definition of "medical ex-
periment":
(a) The severance or penetration or damaging of tissues of a human subject or the use
of a drug or device, . . electromagnetic radiation, heat or cold, or a biological sub-
stance or organism, in or upon a human subject in the practice or research of medicine in
a manner not reasonably related to maintaining or improving the health of such subject
or otherwise directly benefiting such subject.
(b) The investigational use of a drug or device ....
(c) Withholding medical treatment from a human subject for any purpose other than
maintenance or improvement of the health of such subject.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24174 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
For example, the testing of a new drug, device, or procedure on normal human subjects to
determine its safety or effectiveness is research, as is the use of the standard electrocardiogram to
gather new data about a certain type of heart impairment in affected patients. Research can be
further classified as therapeutic or nontherapeutic. The New York and California statutory defini-
tions of research, however, appear to encompass only nontherapeutic research. Research is thera-
peutic if the researcher intends to benefit his subjects. For example, the use of a new drug to
induce labor is intended to benefit the subject directly and immediately, as is a kidney or heart
transplantation, so these interventions would be considered therapeutic. Nevertheless, they are
more like research than like treatment, because of the unknown risks involved or the newness of
the procedures utilized. Although discussion here will be limited to nontherapeutic research, defi-
nitional disputes over whether a particular intervention constitutes research or therapy are not
uncommon. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afl'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. 1974) (first artificial heart implantation in human not an experiment).
2. Protection of Human Subjects Article, ch. 450, § 1, 1975 N.Y. Laws 89, codfiedat N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-2446 (McKinney 1977).
3. Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act, ch. 360, 1978 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 997, codoedat CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24179.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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both acts is the requirement of informed consent4 by subjects involved
in human experimentation. A comparison of these two statutory
schemes thus provides insight into the philosophical and practical
problems surrounding informed consent in the research setting-why it
is important and how it should be obtained.
Research with human subjects is taking place on an enormous
scale and has become an important source of scientific information.
The California-based Institute for the Study of Medical Ethics esti-
mates that at least 100,000 persons per year are used as subjects in med-
ical experiments in that state alone.' Despite this great volume of
4. There is no universally accepted definition of informed consent. Perhaps the simplest one
is Mr. Justice Blackmun's in Planned Parenthood v.'Danforlh: "the giving of information to the
patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences." 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
Beyond this bare outline, the specific elements of an informed consent are a matter of statutory
and case law, developed primarily in the context of medical malpractice-that is, for consent to
therapy rather than consent to research. At least twenty-three states currently have statutes defin-
ing informed consent for the purposes of medical malpractice actions, J. LUDLAM, INFORMED
CONSENT 41 n.l (1978), and literature and case law on therapeutic consent abound. See, e.g.,
Plante, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Comment, Informed
Consent in MedicalMalpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Comment, Medical Malpractice in
North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1214, 1235 (1976); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal
Therapyfor the Doctor-Patient Relationshp, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970); and cases discussed therein.
Definitions of informed consent to research are much rarer. A few scattered statutes exist defining
informed consent in specific and limited kinds of experimental procedures, e.g., Oregon's psycho-
surgery statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 426.715(2) (1973). New York and California appear to have the
only comprehensive definitions of informed consent to research. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2441(5) (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
A medical malpractice action for failure to obtain the patient's informed consent to therapy is
almost universally recognized to be a negligence action. Historically, the cause of action began as
one for battery-an intentional tort-but that cause of action survives today only in limited cir-
cumstances, such as the failure to obtain any consent at all. See, e.g., McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liabilityfor Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957). A failure to obtain
informed consent is generally a failure to provide the patient with all the information necessary to
make a reasoned, independent decision about whether to undergo a particular therapy. What
information must be revealed in any given situation depends not only on the circumstances of the
case but also on the standard of disclosure employed--either the professional standard, whereby
the physician is obligated to tell the patient only what doctors in the community believe ought to
be revealed (the current majority position in the courts, see Comment, Informed Consent in Ken-
tucky 4fter the Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims 4ct of 1976, 65 KY, L.J. 524, 530
(1976)), or the material risk standard, which focuses on those risks that a reasonable patient would
not ordinarily be aware of and would consider significant (a growing minority view, see Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). Under either
standard disclosure may be limited by invocation of the therapeutic privilege, which allows the
physician to withhold information he reasonably believes would harm the patient or impede ther-
apy; see note 73 infra. The different nature of the research context-where the risks may be
unknown, where the usual doctor-patient relationship does not or ought not exist, and where
direct, immediate benefit to the subject is not expected or even sought-suggests that a more
complete disclosure should be required to satisfy the requirements of informed consent to re-
search, and that the therapeutic privilege should never be invoked to justify the withholding of
information about the research. See authorities cited notes 62-63 infra.
5. Between 1974 and 1976, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) pro-
vided federal funding for more than 2100 projects involving human subjects in California alone.
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experimentation, there have been no modem appellate court decisions
in the United States recognizing subjects' rights to informed consent.6
This lack of case law is not, however, an accurate measure of the safety
or acceptability of human experimentation for several reasons. First,
even in the ordinary medical malpractice action, failure to obtain in-
formed consent to treatment frequently is not alleged7 because a claim
based on lack of informed consent is not an easy one to prove.8 Sec-
ond, the injury suffered must be substantial in order to make the suit
financially feasible.' Finally, problems peculiar to the research setting
make it less likely that human experimentation suits will be brought
successfully: when their consent is uninformed or not obtained at all,
many subjects may not be able to discover the identity of the responsi-
ble researcher; they may not even be aware that they have participated
in an experiment.' °
Injuries to research subjects and violations of subjects' rights do
indeed occur," however, as illustrated by two paradigm cases-Ha-
lushka v. University of Saskatchewan'2 and Hyman v. Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital.'3 In Halushka, a student volunteered for a university
According to the National Institute of Health, however, 60% of the research conducted nationwide
is funded by sources other than HEW. In addition, some uses of experimental drugs and proce-
dures are not included in agency calculations as experiments. The Institute for the Study of Medi-
cal Ethics arrived at its estimate of the number of research subjects in California using HEW and
NIH figures and a Michigan survey for the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which indicates that the number of subjects
averages 50 per experiment. P. ROBINSON, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION WITHOUT INFORMED
CONSENT 57-58 (1978).
6. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
18 (1977) (hereinafter cited as G. ANNAS). The cases discussed in text accompanying notes 12-18
infra are the only two modern experimentation decisions on record. One is a Canadian decision
and the other, a state court review of an administrative procedure, deals only with disciplinary
action against researchers and not the elements of any subject's claims against them.
7. Failure to obtain informed consent was alleged in only 14% of all medical malpractice
suits in 1974. J. LUDLAM, supra note 4, at 6.
8. In a medical malpractice action alleging failure to obtain informed consent, the plaintiff
must prove that a risk of the procedure that should have been revealed to him was not revealed,
that a reasonable person, had he known of that risk, would not have consented to the procedure,
and that the unrevealed risk materialized to his injury. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Miller
v. Kennedy, II Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974).
9. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 61.
10. See text accompanying notes 17-18 infra.
I1. The Institute for the Study of Medical Ethics has collected ample statistical and anecdotal
evidence of research without proper informed consent, much of which contained serious undis-
closed risks and some of which resulted in severe injury. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5.
12. [1965]52 W.W.R. 608 (Sask. Ct. App.), reproducedinpart inJ. KATz, EXPERIMENTATION
wITH HUMAN BEINGS 569-73 (1972).
13. 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245, rev'dper curlam, 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
1979]
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hospital experiment in order to earn fifty dollars. The experiment con-
sisted of cardiac catheterization,1 4 a hazardous procedure, to test a new
anesthetic agent for the first time.15 Plaintiff Halushka, misinformed
about the nature of the procedure and the severity of the risks involved,
gave his consent, and suffered a cardiac arrest during the experiment.'
6
In Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, twenty-two chronically ill, eld-
erly hospital patients were given injections of live cancer cells to see
how long it would take for their bodies to reject the cells. 17 Although
there was no chance of the subjects' developing cancer from the injec-
tions, the researchers did not inform them of the nature of the cells,
fearing that no one would consent if the word "cancer" were men-
tioned.'8
Halushka and Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital demonstrate both
pragmatic and philosophical reasons for obtaining informed consent in
human experimentation. The reasons for ensuring informed consent-
to promote individual autonomy and to encourage rational decision-
making' 9-- serve both as means of protecting human subjects from
harm and as ends desirable in themselves. If Halushka had been more
fully apprised of the risks associated with the catheterization experi-
ment, it is highly unlikely that he would have consented. In addition,
faced with a requirement of full disclosure, the researcher himself ar-
guably would have been forced to examine the risks involved more
closely and might have modified his experiment accordingly.20 Thus,
had the opportunity for informed consent been afforded in Halushka,
the ultimate goal of harm prevention would probably have been
achieved. In contrast, the subjects in Jewish Chronic Disease Hos-
pital were not physically harmed. Nevertheless, their right to receive
818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338 (1965). Materials from this administrative disci-
plinary hearing are reproduced extensively in J. KATz, supra note 12, at 41-44.
14. Cardiac catheterization is the passage of a hollow tube into the heart through a vein or
artery to measure different aspects of heart function. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 238 (23d
ed. 1976).
15. J. KATZ, supra note 12, at 569-70.
16. Id. at 570.
17. Id. at 10, 42.
18. Id. at 11, 25-26, 42.
19. G. ANNAS, supra note 6, at 33-34. Annas condenses the six functions of informed consent
postulated in J. KArz & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASE: WHo DECIDES WHAT? 82-90
(1975) to the two functions mentioned in text. Katz and Capron's six functions are: "to promote
individual autonomy," to protect the subject's humanity, "to avoid fraud and duress," "to en-
courage self-scrutiny" by the researcher, "to encourage rational decisionmaking, and to involve
the public."
20. See G. ANNAS, supra note 6, at 35-37.
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information, as well as the researchers' duty to convey it, was disre-
garded,2 leaving some subjects confused and angry. Such violations of
human dignity and autonomy are themselves injuries.
22
Both the New York and California human experimentation stat-
utes express the dual goals of protecting the autonomy interests of
human subjects and preventing harm to them.2 3 Their different defini-
tions of informed consent and their different means of ensuring that
such consent is obtained, however, fulfill those goals in varying de-
grees.
An informed consent has three components: the capacity of the
subject to give consent, the context in which consent is sought (how,
when, and where consent is sought, for example), and the content, the
information given to the subject as the basis for consent.24 The New
York and California definitions of informed consent are primarily con-
cerned with content." Both statutes contain similar noninclusive lists
21. See J. KArz, supra note 12, at 40-41.
22. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body .. " Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See also Gray, Complexities ofInformed Consent, 437 ANNALS AMER. ACAD.
PSYCH. Soc. Sc. 37, 45-46 (1978). Plainly, autonomy encompasses the right to make decisions for
any reasons, including "bad" ones. Complete disclosure in Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, how-
ever, could have reduced the likelihood of irrational, phobic refusals by affording prospective
subjects ample information and opportunity for rational questioning, explanation and discussion.
23. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2440 (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24171 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
24. A portion of the judgment in United States v. Brandt, Trial of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vols. 1 & 2, "The Medical Case" (1948), the Nuremberg trial of
Nazi physicians, is widely known as the Nuremberg Code. It set forth the ethical principles of
human experimentation, which include:
IT]he person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as
to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of
force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coer-
cion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision.
J. KATZ, supra note 12, at 305 (the trial testimony is excerpted extensively beginning at id., 292).
The World Medical Organization's Declaration of Helsinki also recognizes that:
The nature, the purpose, and the risk of clinical research must be explained to the
subject by the doctor.
Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his free consent,
after he has been fully informed; if he is legally incompetent, the consent of the legal
guardian should be procured.
The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical and legal state
as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.
J. KATZ, supra note 12, at 312-13.
25. Concentration on the "laundry list" of consent information items may tend to mask the
problem of a researcher's failure to convey information effectively. See G. ANNAS, supra note 6,
at 43 ("the end is the process of decision-making," not merely the documentation of consent);
Gray, supra note 22, at 43; note 59 and accompanying text infra.
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of information that must be conveyed, such as an explanation of the
procedures and their purposes, the expected risks and/or benefits, the
available alternative procedures, an offer to answer questions and an
instruction about the subject's freedom to withdraw.26 The California
Act, however, has some important additional requirements. Subjects
must be informed whether a placebo is being used in the experiment
(but not that they personally will or will not receive it)27 and must be
given the names and institutional affiliations of the researchers, 2 the
sponsors or funding sources, 29 and the manufacturers of any drugs or
devices being tested.3"
Although the primary focus of the new human experimentation
legislation is upon the content of informed consent, there are also pro-
visions in both statutes that concern the capacity of the subject to give
consent and the context in which it is sought. Both statutes provide for
consent by persons other than the subject when the subject is legally
incompetent to give consent;3" California, however, does not permit
such representatives to consent to procedures that are not designed to
benefit the subject.32 Both statutes assert that consent should be ob-
tained in circumstances that are not characterized by force or fraud, 3
but neither specifies how to avoid such coercion or deceit. The Califor-
nia Act requires that in addition to a consent form the subject must be
given a copy of an "experimental subject's bill of rights. '' 34 California
26. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2441(5) (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24173(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See also HEW Regulations on the Protection of Human
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(c)(l)-(6) (1978). The New York Article closely resembles the HEW
regulations, which apply to all research institutions receiving federal funds nationwide. The Cali-
fornia Act parallels them in part but also is designed to overcome some perceived shortcomings of
the HEW approach. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 45-53.
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The subject's
right to know is thus considered more important than the possible, although probably slight, inter-
ference with the placebo effect that such knowledge might engender.
28. Id. § 24173(c)(8).
29. Id. § 24173(c)(9).
30. Id. Subsections 24173(c)(8) and (9) of the California Act help to ensure that the subject
knows he is part of an experiment and help to facilitate further questioning by the subject, but
their primary purpose is to let the subject know against whom he can proceed in case his statutory
rights have been violated. Since it is the subject who bears the responsibility for "enforcing the
informed consent requirement in California, such provisions are appropriate. Id. § 24176, Under
the New York statute, on the other hand, they are unnecessary because a human research review
committee bears that responsibility instead. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text infra.
31. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24175(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
33. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2441(5) (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 241720), 24173(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The experimental sub-
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also requires that an oral explanation of the material contained in the
consent form be given 3 5 in a language in which the subject is fluent,
36
and witnessed.37 Both of these requirements are apparently designed to
minimize intimidation and maximize comprehension.
Although the statutory informed consent requirements of New
York and California are intended to apply to all human experimenta-
tion taking place within each state, 8 there are important differences
between the two statutes in their methods of enforcement, reflecting a
difference in the interests they are intended to protect. New York's en-
forcement mechanism focuses primarily on protecting subjects from
harm,39 whereas California's is directed primarily toward safeguarding
the subject's autonomy and the decisionmaking process. 40 The New
York Article requires all researchers to affiliate themselves with an in-
stitution conducting research.4' All research institutions must in turn
have a human research review committee,42 which must examine all
jects' bill of rights resembles patients' bills of rights, which came into vogue with the American
Hospital Association's A PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS (1972). That document strongly resembles
the statement of patients' rights in JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, PRE-
AMBLE, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 1970 UPDATED 1973, 21 (1973). See K. WING,
THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 109 (1976). A number of states have codified similar pa-
tients' rights bills. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (McKinney 1977).
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
36. Id. §§ 24172, 24173(c).
37. Id. § 24173(d).
38. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2440 (McKinney 1977); Legislative Counsel's Digest ac-
companying Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act, ch. 360, 1978 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 997 ("No existing law regulates all medical experimentation in this state on human
beings."). Both statutes were enacted to supplement the HEW regulations; see note 26 supra.
HEW regulations are applicable only to research conducted in those institutions that seek federal
grants, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1978), leaving an estimated 60% of research unregulated nationwide
(except for voluntary self-reviewing systems); see note 5 supra.
California's definition of medical experiment does not appear to include psychological re-
search, whereas New York's definition explicitly does (if "psychological intervention. . . upon
the body of the subject" can be so construed). See definitions quoted in note I supra.
39. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2440 (McKinney 1977) states in part: "Human research may
effect dangerous and unanticipated results causing irreversible damage to the human subject. Ac-
cordingly, it shall be the policy of this state to protect its people against the unnecessary and
improper risk of pain, suffering or injury resulting from human research conducted without their
knowledge or consent."
40. "The Legislature. . . finds and declares that medical experimentation on human beings
. . . shall be undertaken with due respect to the preciousness of human life and the right of indi-
viduals to determine what is done to their own bodies." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24171
(West Cum. Supp. 1979). See also notes 68-74 and accompanying text infra.
41. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2444(3) (McKinney 1977).
42. Id. § 2444(1) provides in pertinent part:
Such committee shall be composed of not less than five persons . . . who have such
varied backgrounds as to assure the competent, complete and professional review of
human research activities conducted or proposed to be conducted or authorized by the
institution or agency .... No committee shall consist entirely of persons who are of-
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proposed and ongoing research for scientific merit and compliance with
informed consent requirements.43 The California Act has a markedly
different emphasis. It bypasses committee review entirely and instead
provides civil and criminal penalties--enforceable against the person
primarily responsible for the research-for negligent or wilful failure to
obtain the subject's informed consent, regardless of whether the subject
was actually injured.' These sanctions are intended to make recovery
available to otherwise uninjured subjects from whom consent was not
obtained, but they are not meant to supplant the existing common-law
negligence action for failure to obtain informed consent, which can be
ficers, employees, or agents of, or who are otherwise associated with the institution or
agency,.., and no committee shall consist entirely of members of a single professional
group.
In the literature such committees are most often referred to as institutional review boards
(IRBs).
43. Id. § 2444(2) provides in pertinent part:
The committee shall review each proposed human research project to determine (1) its
necessity; (2) that the rights and welfare of the human subjects involved are adequately
protected; (3) that the risks to the human subjects are outweighed by the potential bene-
fits to them or by the importance of the knowledge to be gained; (4) that the voluntary
informed consent is to be obtained by methods that are adequate and appropriate; and
(5) that the persons proposed to conduct the particular medical research are appropri-
ately competent and qualified.
This review committee is essentially identical to the institutional review boards required by the
HEW regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b) (1978).
44. Section 24176 provides in part:
(a) Any person who is primarily responsible for conduct of a medical experiment
and who negligently allows such experiment to be conducted without a subject's in-
formed consent. . . shall be liable to such subject in an amount not to exceed one thou-
sand dollars ($1,000), as determined by the court. The minimum amount of damages
awarded shall be fifty dollars ($50).
(b) Any person who is primarily responsible for the conduct of a medical experi-
ment and who willfully fails to obtain the subject's informed consent. . . shall be liable
to such subject in an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) as determined
by the court.
(c) Any person who is primarily responsible for the conduct of a medical experi-
ment and who willfully fails to obtain the subject's informed consent. . . and thereby
exposes a subject to a known substantial risk of serious injury, either bodily harm or
psychological harm, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail for a period not to exceed one year or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000)
or both.
(d) Any representative or employee of a pharmaceutical company, who is directly
responsible for contracting with another person for the conduct of a medical experiment,
and who has knowledge of risks or hazards with respect to such experiment, and who
willfully withholds information of such risks and hazards from the person contracting for
the conduct of the medical experiment, and thereby exposes a subject to substantial risk
of serious injury, either bodily harm or psychological harm, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not to exceed one
year or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24176 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). It is interesting to note that
earlier versions of the California Act provided only criminal penalties-at one time felony status,
with imprisonment of two to four years, and later misdemeanor status, with the only option being
one year of imprisonment. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 122.
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brought only when actual injury has occurred.4 5 A research subject in-
jured through the failure of the researcher to obtain informed consent
should thus find both causes of action available in California.4 6
New York's statute apparently reflects a legislative preference for
the philosophical and practical advantages of the committee review
system for ensuring informed consent. There are three distinct but re-
lated arguments for the superiority of the committee review system.
First, requiring review of proposed research protocols maximizes the
prospective researcher's opportunity to consider ethical issues. The em-
phasis in protocol review is on promoting rational decisionmaking on
the part of the researcher. Furthermore, the mere existence of the com-
mittee may discourage researchers from even proposing protocols of
dubious ethical or scientific merit. 7
Second, the emphasis in a committee review system is prophylac-
tic; it is directed toward keeping informed consent cases out of the
courts by taking care of potential problems before they arise. The com-
mittee review system in the New York Article is likely to be more effec-
tive than the California Act in this respect, despite the Act's substantial
deterrent potential, simply because it mandates consideration by third
parties before research begins.
Third, in addition to review of the informed consent procedure,
the committee provides review of the scientific merit of a proposed ex-
periment. This review is intended to prevent experimentation that is
unnecessary or unnecessarily dangerous (ie., experiments in which the
risks outweigh the potential benefits).48 Merely requiring informed
consent does not always accomplish this desirable end, unless the dis-
parity between risks and benefits is properly explained to prospective
subjects in the consent process. Even after a complete explanation it is
conceivable that a competent person could consent to be a research
45. Negligence actions for failure to obtain informed consent have generally been brought
only in the ordinary medical malpractice context. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. Ha-
lushka exemplifies the emerging cause of action in the research setting. See text accompanying
notes 12-16 supra. It is to be expected that as both the statutory and common law causes of action
develop in California, they will be modeled on that state's medical malpractice cases.
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24176(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) provides: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to limit or expand the right of an injured subject to recover
damages under any other applicable law."
47. Interview with Dr. Edward Bishop, Chairman, Committee on the Protection of the
Rights of Human Subjects, University of North Carolina School of Medicine, North Carolina
Memorial Hospital, Chapel Hill (January 15, 1979). Self-censorship can occur for many reasons,
with fear of professional embarrassment probably foremost.
48. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2444(2) (McKinney 1977), quoted in note 43 supra. The
requirement of informed consent thus is only one of several means of preventing subject harm.
1979]
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subject in an unnecessarily dangerous experiment. Insofar as it would
prevent such experimentation, the New York Article thus sacrifices
some subject autonomy in preference for direct restriction of research.
In practice, however, the committee review system has certain dis-
advantages.49 First and most obvious, New York's system suffers from
a lack of sanctions against noncompliance. Although the statute does
provide that "[t]he commissioner shall have the power to promulgate
such rules and regulations as shall be necessary and proper to effectuate
the purposes of this article," 50 apparently no rules or regulations have
been promulgated.5 In addition, institutional researchers can easily
bypass committee review through clandestine experimentation-a rela-
tively common occurrence.5 2 Noninstitutional researchers need only
refrain from affiliating themselves with research institutions in order to
avoid committee review. Committees are not equipped with the time,
manpower, training or inclination to police ongoing research within
their own institutions,53 and it is certainly unrealistic to expect them to
play any role in identifying unaffiliated researchers. Because unaffili-
ated research is a large part of the informed consent problem,54 the lack
of sanctions against this researcher population may be a serious short-
coming in New York's approach.
Furthermore, because the function of a review committee is aca-
demic and ministerial, dealing only with the form and content of the
research protocols and consent forms submitted to it, the nature of the
follow-up a committee can do is limited to periodic, paper re-reviews of
protocols for ongoing research.55 Time and manpower limitations
49. See generally Robertson, Ten Ways to Improve IRBs, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29
(1979).
50. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2446 (McKinney 1977).
51. A 1971 draft assembly bill proposed to the New York state legislature as an amendment
to the state Education Law, which never passed and parts of which may have resurfaced in the
New York Article, provided that the committee could obtain injunctions and cease and desist
orders against researchers as well as use "such informal and non-coercive means as it may deem
appropriate." Proposed A.B. 1837 (1971), quotedin J. KATz, supra note 12, at 854. Review com-
mittee members, however, do not see themselves as policemen and therefore prefer informal
measures. Interview with Dr. Edward Bishop, note 47 supra.
52. See B. GRAY, HUMAN SUBJECTS IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 39 (1975). The re-
searchers in Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital were able to keep their research secret even though it
was conducted openly. See J. KATZ, supra note 12, at 15.
53. See note 51 supra.
54. Cooperation between pharmaceutical companies and private physicians to dispense ex-
perimental drugs for therapeutic use is common. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 28-42. Robin-
son describes physician testing of a number of experimental drugs, including thalidomide. This
kind of private experimentation is often difficult to distinguish from medical treatment. See note
I supra.
55. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2444(2) (McKinney 1977).
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again may greatly affect both original and follow-up review, and unless
the committee receives a complaint, compliance with the approved pro-
tocol is up to the individual researcher.5 6 Committee approval of a
consent form cannot, in itself, ensure that the form will be used.
5 7
The role of the committee in processing research protocols tends to
focus the informed consent inquiry primarily, if not exclusively, on the
contents of the consent form." Even conscientious researchers who
comply with their approved protocols may then neglect to consider the
setting in which consent is obtained, the consent capacity of their sub-
jects, or the need for verbal as well as written presentation of informa-
tion;59 even the most complete of approved forms, therefore, may not
produce informed consent. This could represent a serious problem for
the uncomprehending subject, especially if, as has been suggested,60
committee approval is offered as a defense to an informed consent suit.
A final difficulty with the committee review system inheres in the
committee makeup itself. New York only requires that one member of
the committee be a nonscientist. 61  Thus the committee system may
56. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 49-50.
57. A 1976 University of Michigan study showed that subject consent was not obtained in
12% of HEW-funded research in Michigan. Id. at 49.
58. In a study for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, 25% of the researchers interviewed at 61 institutions reported
committee modification of their proposed consent forms. Gray, supra note 22, at 43.
59. B. GRAY, supra note 52, at 209 emphasizes that
the setting in which informed consent is to take place is of great importance in achieving
valid consent. Thisobvious point has generally been overlooked in the literature on
informed consent and in the regulation of human experimentation. Thus, for example,
the need is not recognized for review committees to go beyond examining proposed con-
sent forms to inquiring about the setting in which the form is to be given to subjects.
However, even a clear consent form may be of little utility under unfavorable circum-
stances.
The author documents a labor induction study in which twenty of the fifty-one subjects inter-
viewed did not know they were subjects, even though "all had signed a consent form approved by
an active and conscientious human subjects review committee." Gray, supra note 22, at 43. The
labor room is hardly an optimal place for obtaining informed consent, and a woman in labor may
be temporarily incapable of the concentration required to comprehend a consent form. See also
P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 49.
60. B. GRAY, supra note 52, at 51. Analagously, a number of state therapeutic consent stat-
utes provide that a signed consent form is prima facie or conclusive evidence that informed con-
sent has been given. J. LUDLAM, supra note 4, at 42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1977):
A consent which is evidenced in writing and which meets the foregoing standards, and
which is signed by the patient or other authorized person, shall be presumed to be a valid
consent. This presumption, however, may be subject to rebuttal only upon proof that
such consent was obtained by fraud, deception or misrepresentation of a material fact.
Provisions such as these are to be distinguished from a waiver or release of rights, which is prohib-
ited under both statutes. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1977); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 24176(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
61. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2444(1) (McKinney 1977), quoted in note 42 supra.
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harbor a systemic bias in favor of research, often approving research
protocols that contain greater risks than might be sanctioned by the
average layman.62 The judgment of a committee composed predomi-
nantly of scientists is, therefore, no substitute for that of the hypotheti-
cal reasonable person who appears in the recent informed consent
cases63 in determining which risks are substantial enough that they
must be revealed.' Because the committee decision about which risks
to reveal may not coincide with what the reasonable subject wants to
know, committee approval does not guarantee informed consent as
measured by the modem legal standard. 5
The strengths and weaknesses of the California Act, in contrast,
are diametrically opposed to those found in the New York Article. The
practicality of California's approach is plain: civil and criminal causes
of action for experimentation without injury will have a greater deter-
rent impact than does the ordinary common-law malpractice action.6
Recognizing that committee review is presently not very effective,
6 7
California's legislators bypassed it entirely, thereby losing, however,
the advantages of review in screening out unnecessary, nonbeneficial,
and hazardous research and in supplementing the researcher's own
decisionmaking process.68 Although California's reliance on the indi-
vidual researcher and subject may sacrifice earlier detection of some
instances of negligent failure to obtain informed consent, which com-
mittee review might have prevented, the specificity of the Act's in-
formed consent definition itself and its requirement of witness
verification of consent should encourage thoughtful decisionmaking on
the part of the conscientious researcher. The researcher will be forced
to weigh carefully the risks and benefits of his experiment in formulat-
ing the information that the statute requires be given to the subject.
62. Veatch, Human Experimentation Committees. Professional or Representative? 5 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 31, 37 (1975).
63. The reasonable person figures in the material risk standard discussed in Canterbury P.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1972); see also note 4 supra.
64. Veatch, supra note 62, at 36.
65. See note 4 supra. The problem of which risks to reveal exists in the California Act as
well. An atmosphere that encourages the subject to ask questions should overcome much of the
difficulty by allowing each subject to probe more deeply into areas of special concern. Although
patients may be reluctant to ask questions of their doctors, it is presumed that subjects who know
that they are to participate in an experiment will be less reticent.
66. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 61, 72-73.
67. See id. at 53.
68. To some extent this is offset by the greater detail and specificity of California's informed
consent procedures; see notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
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Lack of a committee, however, should not affect the incidence of wilful
failure to obtain informed consent, because the wilful violator would
avoid compliance with committee-approved guidelines anyway.
The decision to forego a mandatory review committee system 69
places increased emphasis on the individual autonomy of the subject.
For example, under the California Act a competent subject could con-
sent to research that a committee might not approve. The new statu-
tory cause of action, which subjects the researcher to liability for
nondisclosure regardless of harm to the subject, reflects this emphasis
as well. It resembles a battery action-a vindication for the otherwise
noninjurious breach of bodily integrity-much like the one used in the
earliest medical malpractice cases based on failure to obtain consent.7"
It is well established by now, however, that the common-law action for
failure to obtain consent to medical treatment sounds in negligence,7"
and it is this cause of action that is undoubtedly intended to serve as
the model for the new statutory action.72
There are, of course, important differences between research and
treatment that must be accommodated if the experimentation action is
to have its intended impact. The most notable of these differences-the
absence of a doctor-patient relationship in experimentation and the re-
lated lack of therapeutic benefit to the research subject-have led com-
mentators to conclude that the defense of therapeutic privilege73 has no
place in an action for failure to obtain consent for experimentation.
7 4
Thus, it is vital that as much information as possible be given to the
69. Some California institutions, however, have indicated that they will have to set up review
committees in order to comply with the legislation. Interview with Assemblyman Herschel Rosen-
thal, California State Legislature, Sacramento (January 9, 1979). It seems unlikely, however, that
institutions will be considered persons primarily responsible for the conduct of experiments under
the statute, so the response may be made in the spirit of cooperation or from overcaution.
70. See generaliy WALTZ & INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 152-56 (1971). MCCOID, supra
note 4, at 417, makes the following observation:
When... there is no substantial showing that the conduct of the defendant has actually
caused any harm to the [subject] other than the inffiction of incidental pain and suffering
. . the designation of the defendant's conduct as an "assault and battery" seems justi-
filed primarily in terms of protecting the [subject's] interest in making his own decisions
71. See note 4 supra.
72. California has produced the most enlightened negligence standard; see cases cited in note
63 supra.
73. The doctrine of therapeutic privilege holds that a physician may withhold material infor-
mation from his patient if he reasonably believes that disclosure would be harmful. See, e.g.,
cases cited note 63 supra.
74. G. ANNAS, supra note 6, at 31-33, 44-45; Langer, Human Experimentation-New York
Verdict Affirms Patient's Rights, 151 SCIENCE 663, 665-66 (1966), reproduced in J. KATZ, supra
note 12, at 64 (discussing Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital).
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subject because neither the review committee nor the investigator will
be assuming any of the ultimate decisionmaking responsibility and no
direct benefits to the subject may exist to outweigh the risks of the ex-
periment.75 The statutory cause of action, as it is developed by the
courts, must reflect these concerns.
Disputes over what is an experiment and who is a researcher under
the Act can be anticipated.76 Use of experimental drugs, for example,
is actually research but holds potential immediate benefits for the ill
subject and is undertaken under the auspices of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. The California Act, with its explicit coverage of new drug
research77 and its requirement of identification of the drug companies
involved,78 is intended to help make subjects more aware of this com-
mon type of research79 and to alleviate some of the abuses of the doc-
tor-patient relationship that are occasioned by it. In this respect the
California Act is superior to the New York Article because it attempts
to affect researchers, including ordinary private practitioners who are
unaffiliated with institutions and who are unaccumstomed to thinking
of themselves as researchers.
Whether this legislation can accomplish its ambitious goal is, how-
ever, open to question. Subjects of researchers who flout the statute
entirely will still not know that they have been subjects, or if they do,
they might not know whom to sue. Some independent mechanism for
making researchers and subjects aware of the statutory scheme is thus
vital to effective enforcement, especially because plaintiffs need not
have suffered injury and therefore are less likely to come forward on
their own initiative. With some method of information dispensation,80
the statute may be of great help to the poor, the elderly, and the less
educated, who can obtain free or low-cost legal assistance, but the often
75. Langer, supra note 74, at 666. See also notes 4 & 68 supra.
76. See note 1 supra.
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24174(b), 24176(d) (West Curn. Supp. 1979). But cf.
§ 24174(a), defining medical experimentation as intervention "not reasonably related to maintain-
ing or improving the health of such subject or otherwise directly benefiting such subject." This
definition seems clearly to exclude therapeutic research except that covered under subsection (b)
for new drugs and devices.
For a thorough discussion of the special problems raised by therapeutic research, see J. KATZ
& A. CAPRON, supra note 19. The authors argue that therapeutic research should be treated more
like research than like therapy.
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(c)(9) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
79. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
80. This could encompass anything from use of patient advocates or ombudsmen to more
active committee policing of research, including the use of a review committee member as the
consent witness required by CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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nominal recovery will not encourage middle-class subjects who must
pay their own legal fees.8 ' The former group of subjects is, however,
more likely to be injured by a lack of informed consent.8 2 In any case,
the statute should act as a deterrent regardless of who the plaintiffs turn
out to be.
Neither the New York Article nor the California Act is intended to
compensate research subjects for purely fortuitous injury." The im-
pact of the statutes is primarily philosophical-they are, in essence,
paeans to human autonomy. Because neither statute as it stands is
likely to work very well, their function is only secondarily preventive.
Insofar as they are effective, however, it must be presumed that the end
result will be less research. Fully informed potential subjects are less
likely to consent to their being used in an experiment than those sub-
jects who are assured that no risk is present.84
The best way to achieve the goal of informed consent lies in a
combination of the New York and California approaches. Sanctions
tougher than those provided by a committee review system are needed,
but some form of review appears indispensable to monitor compliance
with informed consent requirements and thereby prevent lawsuits as
well as deter violators. Active policing of ongoing research is also
needed to ensure that consent procedures are as conducive to a free
exchange of information as the consent forms promise to be. And the
existence of civil and criminal causes of action tailored especially for
81. Because it will be possible for a plaintiff who suffers actual injury to bring two actions-
one under this statute and one on an ordinary medical malpractice model adapted to experimenta-
tion--the California Act should help draw attention to the latter type of action as well as set
standards for it. In fact, joining the two causes of action in a single suit may increase the incentive
to sue in cases of less serious injuries.
82. See, e.g., B. GRAY, supra note 52, at 66-69 (black clinic patients with less than high school
education far more likely to be unaware subjects in a labor induction study; no data available on
whether this result caused by lack of effort by the investigator to communicate or by the inade-
quacy of honest attempts at explanation).
83. For an excellent discussion of the compensation problem and some possible solutions, see
G. ANNAS, supra note 6, at 257-77.
84. In id., at 35-36, the authors observe: "The view that such promotion of individual auton-
omy comes at the price of sometimes delaying advances is, we think, adequately dealt with by the
oft-quoted statement of Hans Jonas:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not an unconditional commitment,
and that its tempo in particular, compulsive as it may become, has nothing sacred about
it. Let us also remember that a slower progress in the conquest of disease would not
threaten society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore that their particular dis-
ease be not yet conquered, but that society would indeed be threatened by the erosion of
those moral values whose loss, probably caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific
progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having."
(quoting Jonas, Philosophical ReIections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 29
(1969)).
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